

# Backdoor peacekeeping: Does participation in UN peacekeeping reduce coups at home?

Magnus Lundgren

*Department of Political Science, Stockholm University*

Journal of Peace Research  
2018, Vol. 55(4) 508–523  
© The Author(s) 2018  
Reprints and permission:  
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav  
DOI: 10.1177/0022343317747668  
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr



## Abstract

I advance and test a theoretical argument of how participation in UN peacekeeping affects the likelihood of coup attempts in troop-contributing countries (TCCs). The argument highlights the interplay between the economic incentives of militaries in poor TCCs and the UN's preference for contributors with stable civil–military relations. Fearing the loss of UN reimbursement funds, militaries for which such funds are important will avoid visible acts of military insubordination, such as coup attempts, that would place their future participation in UN peacekeeping at risk. I test this proposition against time-series cross-sectional data on 157 countries in the 1991–2013 period using panel regression and matching. The data show that countries where the armed forces are more dependent on peacekeeping revenues experience fewer coup attempts than comparable peers, even when taking coup-proofing measures and other alternative explanations into account. I also find that the coup-restraining effect is only observed in periods where member states contribute enough troops to award the UN a real choice over alternative contributors. The study introduces a novel theoretic logic, presents empirical results at odds with the existing literature, and suggests important policy implications with regard to UN vetting and standards for troop-contributing countries.

## Keywords

civil–military relations, coups, peacekeeping, United Nations

Whereas the typical peacekeeper of the past came from a wealthy country with solid democratic institutions, the typical peacekeeper of today comes from a poor and democratizing country. In the last 20 years, the sourcing of troops for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has shifted to low- and middle-income countries, which today supply the vast majority of the more than 100,000 ‘blue helmets’ stationed around the world.<sup>1</sup> Compensation received for their service channels billions of US dollars to militaries in countries with unstable civil–military relations and a higher propensity for coups.

To what extent, and how, does UN peacekeeping influence the incentives and behavior of participating militaries? What are the consequences for the political stability of contributing states? Oddly neglected in conventional peacekeeping research, these questions are at

the center of an emergent literature on participation effects (Sotomayor, 2013; Levin et al., 2016; Savage & Caverley, 2014; Zaman & Biswas, 2014; Dwyer, 2015). In this literature, there is consensus that peacekeeping service abroad affects civil–military relations at home, but the nature and direction of the effect remains in dispute: claims that participation reduces military insubordination stand against claims that it contributes to instability or illiberal entrenchment. Resolving this empirical inconsistency requires both empirical expansion, via the integration of systematic, large-N data, and theoretical elaboration, via the integration of previously overlooked theoretical pathways, such as the role of economic incentives and the strategic interplay between the UN and contributing militaries. The ambition of this article is to provide both.

<sup>1</sup> As per World Bank definitions, low-income countries have a GDP/capita below \$1,025; middle-income countries between \$1,026 and \$12,475; and high-income countries above \$12,476.

I investigate the effect of participation in UN peacekeeping on military coups in troop-contributing states (TCCs). I develop a theoretical argument that highlights the interplay between the economic incentives of TCC militaries, the UN's discretion in selecting troop suppliers, and the UN's preference for democracy and stable civil–military relations. The key implication is a disciplining effect; fearing the loss of UN reimbursement funds, militaries highly dependent on such funds will avoid acts of military insubordination, such as attempted coups, that would risk their future participation. Because it is driven by economic incentives, the coup-restraining effect is likely to be stronger in poorer countries with smaller militaries, and as it is conditioned on the UN's ability to substitute misbehaving TCCs, it is likely to be weaker in periods with an insufficient global supply of peacekeepers.

I test these implications using data on 157 countries in the 1991–2013 period. Statistical evidence shows that countries where the armed forces are more dependent on peacekeeping revenues experience fewer coup attempts, even when taking regime type, development level, and coup-proofing measures into account. The association is strongest in poor countries with small militaries and low expenditure per soldier, suggesting that economic incentives represent a plausible mechanism. I also find that the constraining effect is most clearly observed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a period when the UN had significant bargaining power vis-à-vis TCCs, but not in more recent years, when the UN, strapped for peacekeepers, had little real opportunity to deny participation. Matching evidence further suggests that TCCs may reap democratization benefits not observed among comparable non-contributing peers.

The contribution of the study is three-fold. First, the study presents new empirical findings that throw into doubt claims that participation in UN peacekeeping has destabilizing effects or facilitates illiberal governance (Levin et al., 2016; Savage & Caverley, 2014). While my data suggest that the effect varies across countries, and especially with the size of economic incentives, there is no evidence of a systematic and destabilizing effect, nor of authoritarian entrenchment. Rather, participation in UN peacekeeping appears to reduce coup propensity and firm up democratic governance.

Second, the study develops a novel strategic logic linking peacekeeping participation to the coup propensity of TCCs. While previous research has emphasized socialization or resource pathways, I argue that a mechanism centered on the economic incentives of troop-contributors provides a complementary account.

Case study evidence demonstrates that financial motivations are central to TCCs and that the UN's ability to allow or deny participation is a considerable source of leverage.

Third, the findings suggest some important policy implications with regard to standards and vetting procedures for UN peacekeepers. The results indicate that the bindingness of participation conditionalities depends on a collective action problem: they will not be fully effective until member states contribute enough troops to award the UN a real choice over alternative TCCs. From this perspective, the withdrawal of wealthier countries from UN peacekeeping over the last two decades may have had the unfortunate side effect of undercutting the political stability that some TCCs gain from participation.

### **The effect of peacekeeping participation on troop-contributing countries**

Previous research has invested considerable effort in trying to disentangle the effects of UN peacekeeping on conflict countries (e.g. Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2008) but much less in trying to understand its effect on the countries that contribute troops. Does participation in UN peacekeeping affect troop-contributing states and, if so, in what ways? Building on the literature on civil–military relations (e.g. Feaver, 1999; Cook, 2007), an emergent literature focusing on these questions suggests that peacekeeping does indeed influence civil–military relations, although so far there is no consensus regarding the direction and nature of the effect.

Some argue that peacekeeping abroad can improve civil–military relations at home, primarily via socialization: by participating in international peacekeeping, militaries internalize norms that favor subordination to civilian authorities. For example, Moskos (1975) argues that participation in UN missions instils a 'constabulary ethic' and military professionalism, long thought to diminish the risk of coups (Huntington, 1965). Next to the socialization mechanism, a resource-based argument holds that peacekeeping is stabilizing because it keeps a portion of a country's troops abroad, reducing their ability to interfere in politics (Findlay, 1996). Others, including Worboys (2007) and Sotomayor (2013), draw attention to how peacekeeping can provide a mission reorientation for armed forces in democratizing states. For example, Worboys (2007: 149) relates how in Argentina in the 1990s peacekeeping facilitated the creation of 'an entirely new identity for the armed forces', which functioned to 'direct their attention away from politics'.

On the other side of the debate are scholars arguing that participation may not only fail to improve civil–military relations, but may actually contribute to political instability. For example, Savage & Caverley (2014) argue that peacekeeping service abroad enhances ‘training, operational experience, and confidence’, which may shift the civil–military power balance, increasing the probability of political instability. A similar logic is laid out in Levin et al. (2016: 117), who draw on case evidence from Bangladesh and Fiji to support an argument that external military funding strengthens military independence, with destabilizing consequences: ‘The result of a newly empowered and emboldened military may be a coup’. Analyzing the long-term implications of participation, Levin et al. (2016: 107) also suggest that ‘autocratic states may take on peacekeeping duties as a way of maintaining costly security apparatuses for the purposes of domestic repression’ and that peacekeeping ‘risks becoming a means to facilitate illiberal domestic governance in the developing world’.

In between these camps, there are accounts emphasizing that effects are conditional on interactions with other factors. In the most extensive study of the topic to date, Sotomayor (2013) analyzes evidence from a number of Latin American countries from an organizational theory perspective. He finds that ‘peacekeeping has its most salutary effects when soldiers are socialized to perform tasks that do not resemble the missions they have traditionally performed at home’, something which requires active and purposeful intervention by civilian authorities.

While the debate on participation effects remains inconclusive, it has provided many valuable insights, pointing forward to the next generation of studies. I see three areas where improvements are possible. First, the evidentiary basis can be expanded. As emphasized by Sotomayor (2013: 2), available studies ‘usually focus on single, positive cases and on anecdotal experiences’. A study should be as comprehensive as possible and sensitive to the divergent outcomes, both negative and positive. A statistical analysis is thus a suitable way to expand our understanding of participation effects. Second, while previous studies have examined the effect of troop contributions, they have not adequately captured heterogeneity in terms of how important contributions are to TCCs. It is reasonable to expect that countries more dependent on peacekeeping participation will react differently compared to countries for which peacekeeping is less central. Examining the role of economic incentives is particularly important, as this sensitive topic is recurrent in informal negotiations at the UN, but has until recently (Gaibullov et al., 2015) been largely

disregarded in scholarly literature. Third, many prior studies have privileged the socialization pathway, viewing militaries as non-strategic norm recipients and overlooking their role as actors in a strategic relationship with the UN. Understanding how peacekeeping affects participating militaries requires that we examine their incentives, an insight that emerges from agency perspectives on civil–military relations (e.g. Feaver, 1998) and coups (Svolik, 2009; Powell, 2012; McMahon & Slantchev, 2015), and investigate how they are shaped by the leverage that emanates from UN reimbursements and conditionalities. Here, we can learn from previous IR research, which has demonstrated that the incentives of domestic actors are frequently shaped by the constraints and conditionalities put in place by international organizations (Pevehouse, 2005; Stokke, 1995).

### **The logic of peacekeeping dependency constraints**

My theoretical argument, developed as a narrative below and as a decision-theoretic model in the appendix, posits that economic incentives and UN selection leverage combine to produce a disciplining effect on militaries in poorer (low- and middle-income) TCCs, constraining their behavior in ways that reduce coup attempts. The logic builds on agency theories of coups, quantitative evidence on peacekeeping contributions, and various sources of qualitative data, including a systematic assessment of economic incentives in 29 low- and middle-income TCCs, based on as many published case studies.<sup>2</sup>

From the agency theory perspective, the likelihood of a coup attempt is a function of the military’s strategic calculus: under circumstances where the expected benefits, such as expanded political influence and economic gains, outweigh the costs, including the risk of severe punishment, militaries are more likely to proceed with an attempted coup (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005; McMahon & Slantchev, 2015; Powell & Chacha, 2016). This calculus is influenced by external factors, such as economic shocks (Powell, 2012) or security threats (Desch, 2001), and internal factors, including the many ways in which civilian governments seek to cultivate military loyalty and thwart insubordination. Such ‘coup-proofing’ measures include monitoring, training, budgetary constraints, and institutional fragmentation (Feaver, 2003; Sotomayor, 2013; Hunter, 1997; Pilster & Böhmelt, 2011) and, in poor countries with low

<sup>2</sup> The Online appendix presents a summary of the qualitative evidence from these 29 case studies.




Figure 1. Troop commitments to UN peacekeeping, 1991–2013. Data: Perry & Smith (2013).

military salaries, the provision of opportunities for enrichment via corruption, bribes or business operations (Feaver, 1999).

How can peacekeeping service affect this strategic calculus? At the center of my argument is a causal mechanism built around three interacting factors: the economic incentives facing militaries in low-income countries, the leverage that flows from the UN's discretion in distributing compensation to troop suppliers, and the UN's preference for troops from democratic countries with stable civil–military relations.

First, while motivations for participating in UN peacekeeping vary, economic motivations are central to many developing countries that have become the predominant TCCs (Figure 1). The reimbursements they receive from the UN typically exceed their costs (Gaiulloev et al., 2015).<sup>3</sup> In a given TCC, the beneficiaries of economic benefits may include the national government, military institutions, individual militaries, and private firms (Bellamy & Williams, 2013), but in a typical case, the military is the main beneficiary (Levin et al., 2016; Zaman & Biswas, 2014).

TCC militaries can benefit economically both at the institutional level and individual level. At the institutional level, peacekeeping reimbursements constitute a

significant income for militaries in many low- and middle-income countries. Of the 29 case studies examined here, 22 contained data on the existence of economic incentives at the institutional level, and 15 identified them as a significant motivation for participation. For example, for the Indonesian military, UN reimbursements ‘help ease the burden of maintaining military equipment’; in Malawi, ‘the MDF [Malawian Defense Force] has looked to peacekeeping as a means to generate additional resources’; and in Ghana ‘participation in UN peacekeeping forms part of the military’s internal rewards system’.<sup>4</sup>

At the individual level, economic incentives are widespread. Of the 29 TCCs assessed qualitatively, 27 (93%) list significant individual economic incentives. Since UN compensation rates are based on global averages, they are higher – often much higher – than military salaries in poor countries. The yearly allowance received by a soldier serving abroad as a ‘blue helmet’ may exceed that received during an entire career in national service, allowing many returning soldiers to purchase a home and take the step into a middle-class lifestyle. For example, in Senegal, ‘[s]oldiers who return from peacekeeping missions have a visible living standard higher than their fellows, being able to keep all of the UN’s reimbursement. Most of them subsequently make economic investments or display signs of wealth, such as with a new house and car, paying [sic] tickets for their parents to accomplish pilgrimage to Mecca, etc.’ (Diallo, 2016).

The second component of the logic is the UN’s leverage over TCCs. Since the UN selects troop suppliers (Bellamy & Williams, 2013), it effectively controls the distribution of economic benefits. The UN may be likened to a monopsonist in a market with imperfect competition. As the dominant ‘buyer’ of a good (troops) provided by many suppliers, it can exert influence over them: if it prefers to enter into contracts with suppliers with certain characteristics, then suppliers will want to adopt (or maintain) these characteristics. Such adaptation pressure is undergirded by the ability of the UN to deny participation, in part or in whole, to countries that deviate from its preferred characteristics.

Case evidence suggests that TCC militaries recognize the UN’s leverage over their room for maneuver. For example, during a politically unstable period in Bangladesh, a general, cited in a leaked US diplomatic cable from 2004, said that when contemplating their reaction

<sup>3</sup> In 2016, the UN standard reimbursement rate was 1,332 USD per soldier per month; officers and specialists receive higher amounts. The UN also reimburses TCCs for providing equipment and support services.

<sup>4</sup> Wiharta (2016), Linje et al. (2015), Aubuyn & Aning (2015). See Online appendix for bibliographic details.

to the crisis, the armed forces under his command 'would do nothing to risk its participation in UN peacekeeping missions'.<sup>5</sup> The organization was seen as having 'tremendous leverage over both the Bangladeshi military and civilian rulers because of the country's role in UN peacekeeping missions'.<sup>6</sup>

The third component is the UN's preferences regarding TCC characteristics. While the UN's primary concern is sourcing enough troops to staff its missions, evidence suggests that it has, *ceteris paribus*, a preference for troops from democratic countries with stable civil-military relations (Lebovic, 2004). The preference reflects concerns of effectiveness, reputation, and norms. To begin with, the UN requires troops that can carry out complex missions, including 'strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights' and 'supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes' (United Nations, 2008b). Credible performance of these tasks demands troops sensitive to democratic governance, who can operate hand-in-hand with civilian UN branches, such as UNDP. In addition, the effectiveness of UN missions is contingent on maintaining legitimacy, locally and globally, as well as protecting its reputation. As stated in Security Council Resolution 2272, 'proper conduct by, and discipline over, all personnel deployed in United Nations peace operations are crucial to their effectiveness'. Finally, the UN attaches value to the norms of democracy and military non-interference, in and of themselves, as expressed in the UN Charter, the 'Capstone Doctrine' of UN peacekeeping (United Nations, 2008b), and statements from UN officials.

Case evidence indicates that the UN seeks to exert influence on TCC militaries to comply with this preference. For example, when the government of Fiji, a major contributor given its small population, was threatened by military takeover in 2006, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan contacted the general in charge of the armed forces in Fiji, 'to say that, if the [military] illegally removes the government, the UN will withdraw Fiji troops from all UN peacekeeping operations'.<sup>7</sup> Similarly,

as related by Zaman & Biswas (2014), during an unstable period in Bangladesh in 2007, the UN used its leverage to influence the strategic space available to the Bangladeshi military, forcing it to support a process that aspired to improve democratic governance. Beyond examples of such direct interventions, it is also likely that the UN's leverage is effectuated indirectly, without any explicit target, via the declaration of general principles in line with the preferences above (e.g. United Nations, 2008a).

Taken together, the conjecture is that participation in peacekeeping has a positive effect on the economic welfare of militaries in some low- and middle-income TCCs. Fearing the loss of these benefits, such militaries will seek to avoid acts of military insubordination that may risk their future participation in peacekeeping. In particular, it is expected that TCC militaries will be reluctant to attempt coups, the most visible type of military interference.

The expectation is that this coup-restraining effect is conditional on the scope of economic incentives and the UN's ability to enforce its preferences. First, the effect in a given TCC will depend on the amount of UN compensation relative to other sources of income. The effect will be the strongest in TCCs with small military budgets and low military salaries, as these have the strongest institutional and individual economic incentives. In large but poor countries (e.g. India), economic incentives would be weaker, because the military is larger and thus any given soldier's probability of reaping peacekeeping benefits is lower. In wealthier countries, where costs exceed UN reimbursement and military salaries are higher, there would be no economic incentives and thus no expectation of a coup-restraining effect.

*Hypothesis 1:* Greater dependency on peacekeeping revenues decreases the probability of a military coup attempt.

Second, because the coup-restraining effect depends on the ability of the UN to penalize coup-makers, it is likely conditional on the global supply and demand of UN peacekeepers. The logic is analogous to that of the theory of credible threats: given that its primary interest is staffing its missions, the UN cannot credibly penalize misbehaving TCCs unless it has access to alternative troop suppliers that can cover the shortfall resulting from the exercise of such penalties. The implication is that the effect of peacekeeping participation on coups is likely to vary over time, following fluctuations in the supply and demand of peacekeepers.

<sup>5</sup> US Embassy Dhaka 'USG rejects request for support for possible coup', 24 September 2004 ([https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04DHAKA3164\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04DHAKA3164_a.html)).

<sup>6</sup> US Embassy Dhaka 'USG rejects request for support for possible coup', 24 September 2004 ([https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04DHAKA3164\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04DHAKA3164_a.html)). See also Zaman & Biswas (2014).

<sup>7</sup> US Embassy Fiji, 'UN threatens Fiji PKO participation', 27 November 2006 ([https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06SUVA519\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06SUVA519_a.html)).

*Hypothesis 2:* The constraining effect of peacekeeping participation is weaker in periods with fewer alternative troop suppliers.

These hypotheses are formulated with regard to military coup attempts and do not necessarily constitute plausible generalizations for other forms of military interference or insubordination. For example, as discussed further below, it is possible that peacekeeping revenues can foment friction among lower ranks of military organizations, which may actually increase other forms of instability, such as the threat of mutiny. Furthermore, because the theoretic focus is on the military's disposition to mount a coup, and how this disposition is affected by peacekeeping participation regulated by the UN, the logic privileges the interplay between the UN and TCC militaries over the interplay between TCC militaries and civilian governments.

## Research design

The quantity of interest is the effect of troop contributions on coup attempts in TCCs. I estimate this effect using multivariate panel regression and matching techniques. I merged data from several sources to produce a time-series cross-sectional dataset with annual observations on 13 variables across 157 countries (excluding countries with a population lower than 500,000) between 1991 and 2013. The unit of observation is the country-year and there are 2,722 observations in total.

### *Dependent variable*

The dependent variable *Coup attempts* is the count of attempted coups in a country in a given year, sourced from Marshall & Jagers (2002: data cover 1946–2013), who define a coup as a 'forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition faction within the country's ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime'. I examined each coup attempt qualitatively and recoded all non-military cases as 0. Since the theory emphasizes factors that shape the expected utility of a coup, ex ante, it makes sense to focus on coup attempts (cf. Powell & Chacha, 2016), but I include the alternate variable *Coup success* in the robustness checks.

### *Independent variables*

The independent variable *PKO commitment* measures the number (in 1,000s) of military personnel committed to UN peacekeeping by a country in the year of

observation, based on UN data aggregated in Perry & Smith (2013).

The theory predicts that the impact of *PKO commitment* will vary with the importance of peacekeeping revenues to a country's military. To capture this dynamic, I interact *PKO commitment* with the variable *Military budget*, the size of military expenditure (in billions of US dollars) in the year of observation.<sup>8</sup> As a proxy for individual incentives, I include the variable *Expenditure/soldier*, measured in 1,000s of US dollars (Powell, 2012).

To gauge the sensitivity to temporal variation in the supply and demand of peacekeepers, I interact *PKO commitment* with *Aggregate demand*, a variable that measures the total number of peacekeepers in UN missions in the year of observation, scaled to a maximum of 1. This variable reflects realized demand rather than actual demand, but available evidence suggests that the two are correlated.<sup>9</sup>

### *Control variables*

To address endogeneity emerging from the possibility that the UN allocates troop contracts based on the perceived coup risk of presumptive TCCs, I control for coup determinants that could reasonably be observed by the UN, including military and regime characteristics. *Effective organizations*, representing the number of ground-combat-capable organizations in a country, captures the influence of coup-proofing measures, specifically the fragmentation of the military into parallel entities with dispersed command structures (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2011). *Regime durability*, sourced from Polity IV data, measures the years since the most recent authoritarian takeover. *Democracy* is operationalized as the Polity score of the Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jagers, 2002), ranging from -10 to 10, with a higher score indicating a more democratic form of government. To account for the impact of economic growth and decline, I include the variable *Change GDP/capita*, operationalized as the year-on-year change percentage in GDP per capita. *GDP per capita* (in 1,000s of US dollars) measures the level of economic development. *Conflict* is coded as 1 if political violence killed more than 25 people in the year prior to observation, coded from UCDP data (Gleditsch et al., 2002). *Ethnic fractionalization*, coded

<sup>8</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (<https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>).

<sup>9</sup> For example, in 2009–10, a period in which the *Aggregate demand* reaches its maximum, UN forces are described as 'overstretched'. See Gowan (2009).

from Fearon (2003), measures the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in a country, with scores ranging from 0 to 1.

### Modeling strategies

Inference based on panel data presents the analyst with several challenges. First, there is a risk of autocorrelation: observations within countries cannot be assumed to be independent as it is likely, for instance, that *Coup attempts* for a given country in year  $t$  is correlated with the value of the same variable in year  $t + 1$ . Such temporal correlations make OLS or logit inappropriate estimators, and an estimator that corrects for temporal endogeneity is preferable.

A second question is whether one can assume parameter homogeneity, that is whether identical coefficients apply across different countries. A pooling test (Croissant & Millo, 2008) proved insignificant (at the 0.05 significance level), suggesting that parameter homogeneity is a reasonable assumption.

Third, to determine which panel data estimator is the most suitable, I checked for unobserved country-specific effects and whether such effects are correlated with other covariates. A Lagrange multiplier test (Gourieroux, Holly & Monfort, 1982) indicated that unobserved effects exist, and since both theoretical reasoning and a Hausman test (1978) suggested that they are correlated with other covariates, a fixed-effects estimator is preferable.

I therefore rely on a panel data estimator with country fixed effects and panel-corrected standard errors.<sup>10</sup> The estimator corrects for unbalanced time-series in the data, arising from the fact that some countries reached independence after the start of the observation period (e.g. ex-Yugoslavia).

I further address temporal endogeneity concerns by lagging regime proxies by one year and, in the supplementary analysis below, by including a longitudinal analysis of matched country pairs.

### Empirical analysis

As a precursor to multivariate analysis, the bar chart in Figure 2 plots the annual number of coup attempts for countries that made a non-trivial peacekeeping contribution (more than 100 troops in a given year) and those that did not, 1991–2013. It is observed that non-contributing countries experience a higher number of




Figure 2. Coup attempts and democracy in low- and middle-income TCCs and non-TCCs, 1991–2013

Data: Marshall & Jaggers, 2002 (data updated through 2013); Polity IV (2014).

coup attempts than contributing peers. Figure 2 also demonstrates that both types enjoy improving democracy scores, but that TCCs rank higher than non-TCCs throughout. These descriptive patterns are consistent with theoretical expectations, confirming that further analysis is warranted.

Table I summarizes the main results of the multivariate analysis.<sup>11</sup> All models present panel regression models to analyze whether increasing dependency on peacekeeping revenues is associated with a lower probability of coup attempts. Model 1 is a parsimonious model estimated without any interactions; Models 2 and 3 include interactions to represent economic incentives; Models 4 and 5 do the same, but are estimated based on data on low- and middle-income countries; Model 6 includes an interaction to test Hypothesis 2.

In line with Hypothesis 1, the coefficients for *PKO commitment* are negative and statistically significant across all specifications. The negative coefficient suggests that, holding a range of factors constant, countries that contribute more troops to UN peacekeeping (and hence collect higher amounts of remuneration) tend to have

<sup>10</sup> The specification is  $y_{it} = \alpha + \beta x_{it} + \gamma x_{it} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it}$  where  $i$  represents the index for country  $i$ ,  $t$  is the year;  $y_{it}$  is coup incidence in country  $i$  in year  $t$ ;  $\beta$  is a vector of explanatory coefficients;  $\mu_i$  are country fixed effects; and  $\epsilon_{it}$  is an error term (clustered two-ways on country and year).

<sup>11</sup> I took several steps to ensure the results are not sensitive to peculiarities of model specification. Besides the robustness checks reported here, the Online appendix reports models based on alternative coup data (Table A.IV), successful coups (Table A.IV), binary estimators (Table A.IV), data excluding the Americas (A.V), and a negative binomial estimator (A.VI).

Table I. Determinants of military coup attempts, 1991–2013, fixed-effects panel regression

|                                  | <i>Dependent variable:</i><br><i>Count of military coup attempts</i> |                             |                             |                                    |                                    |                                    |
|----------------------------------|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                                  | <i>All countries</i><br>(1)  | <i>All countries</i><br>(2) | <i>All countries</i><br>(3) | <i>Developing countries</i><br>(4) | <i>Developing countries</i><br>(5) | <i>Developing countries</i><br>(6) |
| PKO commitment                   | −0.01*<br>(0.003)  | −0.01*<br>(0.003)           | −0.01*<br>(0.004)           | −0.01*<br>(0.004)                  | −0.01**<br>(0.004)                 | −0.03**<br>(0.003)                 |
| Military budget                  | −0.15*<br>(0.07)   | −0.12<br>(0.08)             | −0.12†<br>(0.07)            | −0.70**<br>(0.27)                  | −0.44†<br>(0.25)                   | −0.31<br>(0.23)                    |
| Democracy ( <i>t</i> −1)         | 0.002<br>(0.003)   | 0.002<br>(0.003)            | 0.002<br>(0.003)            | 0.002<br>(0.004)                   | 0.002<br>(0.004)                   | 0.002<br>(0.004)                   |
| Conflict ( <i>t</i> −1)          | 0.07*<br>(0.03)  | 0.07*<br>(0.03)             | 0.07*<br>(0.03)             | 0.09**<br>(0.03)                   | 0.09**<br>(0.03)                   | 0.08**<br>(0.03)                   |
| Regime durability ( <i>t</i> −1) | 0.001<br>(0.001)   | 0.001<br>(0.001)            | 0.001<br>(0.001)            | 0.002†<br>(0.001)                  | 0.002†<br>(0.001)                  | 0.002†<br>(0.001)                  |
| Effective org.                   | 0.0002<br>(0.01)   | 0.0002<br>(0.01)            | 0.001<br>(0.01)             | 0.004<br>(0.02)                    | 0.01<br>(0.02)                     | 0.005<br>(0.02)                    |
| Expenditure/soldier              | 0.04<br>(0.04)   | 0.04<br>(0.04)              | 0.04<br>(0.04)              | −0.23<br>(0.31)                    | −0.30<br>(0.33)                    | −0.19<br>(0.32)                    |
| Chg. GDP/cap                     | −0.12*<br>(0.06)   | −0.12*<br>(0.06)            | −0.12*<br>(0.06)            | −0.19*<br>(0.09)                   | −0.19*<br>(0.09)                   | −0.19*<br>(0.09)                   |
| PKO com. × Mil. budg.            |  | 0.05<br>(0.03)              |                             | 0.16†<br>(0.09)                    |                                    |                                    |
| PKO com. × Exp./soldier          |  |                             | 0.09*<br>(0.04)             |                                    | 0.26†<br>(0.14)                    |                                    |
| Aggregate demand                 |  |                             |                             |                                    |                                    | −0.02<br>(0.02)                    |
| PKO com. × Agg. demand           |  |                             |                             |                                    |                                    | 0.02**<br>(0.01)                   |
| Fixed country effects            | Yes  | Yes                         | Yes                         | Yes                                | Yes                                | Yes                                |
| Observations                     | 2,722  | 2,722                       | 2,722                       | 1,863                              | 1,863                              | 1,863                              |
| F Statistic                      | 4.32**   | 3.86**                      | 3.89**                      | 4.54**                             | 4.54**                             | 4.19**                             |

†  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Errors clustered two-ways on countries and years. Calculations in R version 3.4.1.

fewer coups than comparable countries that contribute fewer troops. As is evident from the positive coefficient for the interaction term (*PKO commitment* × *Military budget*), the association diminishes with increasing military budgets, implying that the effect of *PKO commitment* is largest in countries with smaller military budgets. Model 3 suggests that the association is strongest in countries with lower *Expenditure/soldier*, also as theorized. Comparing Models 2 and 3, which use the full data, to Models 4 and 5, estimated on developing countries, suggests that interactions are stronger in the latter group, congruent with the expectation that the proposed logic fits better with developing countries.

Table A.IV in the Online appendix shows that the key results are robust to employing alternative data on coup attempts (Powell & Thyne, 2011) and to formulating the dependent variable in binary terms. If only successful

coups are included, the coefficient for *PKO commitment* remains positive but, on account of fewer observations, fails to reach standard levels of significance ( $p$ -value 0.14).

To illustrate the association in substantive terms, Figure 3 displays predicted probabilities of coup attempts as a function of increasing troop commitments. Three patterns stand out. First, becoming a TCC is associated with a considerable reduction in coup probability, particularly among countries with small militaries or low military salaries, as evidenced by the dark lines in panels (a) and (b), respectively. For example, in countries with small militaries, increasing commitments from nothing to 1,000 troops reduces the annual coup attempt risk from 4% to below 1%. Second, as illustrated by the steeper slope of the dark lines, the reduction in predicted probability is largest in countries with small militaries and low




Figure 3. Probability of coup attempt as a function of troop commitments conditional on (a) military budget and (b) expenditure per soldier

Calculations of predicted probabilities are based on logistic regression models with the same covariates as Models 4 and 5. *Military budget* and *Expenditure/soldier* are set at first quartile (black line) or third quartile (grey line). All other variables are held constant at their means.

salaries. Third, as witnessed by the flattening out of the curves, the effect of participation diminishes as troop commitments increase, suggesting that taking the step into TCC status has a larger impact than increasing the contribution once that status is attained.

To ascertain that these regression results are not driven by modeling choices, I perform a matching analysis. Matching seeks to attain balanced samples of treatment and comparison cases, before measuring the difference in outcome between the two groups (Rubin, 2006). Using nearest-neighbor (Ho et al., 2007) and genetic (Diamond & Sekhon, 2013) matching algorithms, I seek to maximize the similarity of covariate distributions across a group of TCC country-years (‘treatment’) and a group of non-TCC country-years (‘control’).<sup>12</sup> Depending on the threshold used to classify a country as a TCC (number of troops contributed in the year of observation), the procedure yielded between 409 and 713 matched country-year pairs. As can be seen in Figure 4 and Table II, regardless of which treatment threshold is employed, TCCs are less likely to experience a coup attempt.

Hypothesis 2 proposed that the effect of participation should be lower in periods of high peacekeeper demand. In a ‘seller’s market’, the UN must prioritize the staffing of missions over selecting the most qualified troops. If




Figure 4. Coup attempts in matched samples of TCCs and non-TCCs at two different TCC thresholds

Table II. Coup attempts in matched samples of TCC and non-TCC country-years, 1991–2013

| Matching algorithm | TCC threshold | Matched pairs | Mean coups TCCs | Mean coups non-TCCs | T-test p-value |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------|----------------|
| Nearest            | 100           | 713           | 0.0084          | 0.027               | 0.019          |
|                    | 200           | 622           | 0.0048          | 0.021               | 0.0058         |
|                    | 500           | 409           | 0.0024          | 0.037               | 0.0027         |
| Genetic            | 100           | 713           | 0.0084          | 0.028               | 0.092          |
|                    | 200           | 622           | 0.0048          | 0.035               | 0.0076         |
|                    | 500           | 409           | 0.0024          | 0.024               | 0.032          |

<sup>12</sup> Covariates included in the matching are as in Model 1 plus covariates for population, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and continent.




Figure 5. Average marginal effect of PKO commitment on coup attempts conditional on aggregate UN demand

the conjecture is correct, we would expect to see that coups, when interacted with aggregate demand, have less of an impact. The data support this conjecture. The coefficient for the interaction in Model 6 is positive, implying that the impact of *PKO commitment* diminishes as *Aggregate demand* increases. Figure 5 shows that the coefficient for *PKO commitment* is indistinguishable from zero as UN demand approaches its maximum. In other words, in times when the UN demand for troops is high, coup-makers are less likely to suffer negative consequences. While the measure is an imperfect proxy for the UN's actual demand and the statistical association is noisy, the results seem to suggest that the credibility argument at the heart of Hypothesis 2 has some value.

Interacting *PKO commitment* with a binary indicator for the post-2000 period, to capture the reduced force pool following the withdrawal of wealthier nations, leads to similar results (Model 15 in the Online appendix).

With the exception of *Regime durability*, most controls behave as one would expect based on previous research. Coup attempts are more likely in countries destabilized by civil conflict or suffering from negative income shocks.

Taken together, the analysis yields three important results. First, participation in peacekeeping predicts a lower incidence of coup attempts. Both regression and matching analyses showed that TCCs on average experience fewer coup attempts than comparable, non-contributing peers. Second, the impact of participation is conditional on TCC characteristics. Countries with

smaller and underpaid militaries see a greater reduction in the incidence of coup attempts compared with countries with larger and well-paid militaries. Third, participation effects are conditional on the global availability of troops.

The results tie in with Sotomayor's (2013) finding that participation effects are heterogeneous, varying from one country to the next depending on domestic and international factors. However, these results suggest that, on average, the effect is coup-restraining, thereby challenging the notion that participation leads to illiberal entrenchment (Levin et al., 2016) or instability (Savage & Caverley, 2014).

Viewed on its own, the negative association between participation and coup attempts does not let us distinguish between arguments privileging economic incentives, socialization or diversion: all predict that higher participation leads to lower coup probabilities, only via different mechanisms. The observation that the association depends on the size of the military budget also appears consistent with socialization logics: smaller militaries may experience socialization pressures more acutely. Hence, the data do not allow us to reject socialization or diversionary theories, but they suggest that financial incentives are, at the very least, a complementary pathway. And in some cases, this logic appears to provide the best explanation for the observed data. For example, it is not clear how alternative logics would explain the observation that the association between participation and coup attempts varies with military salaries or with the overall supply and demand of peacekeepers.

To further examine the validity of the results, I provide two additional forms of analysis. I first test an additional implication of the theory and I then examine long-term participation effects via a longitudinal study of matched country pairs.

#### *Investigating the penalizing effect*

The theoretical logic is premised on the existence of some form of sanction, via which the participation of coup-making militaries in UN peacekeeping is wholly or partially denied. This premise can be empirically tested. Do we actually observe reduced participation by militaries that attempt coups? To find out, I change the causal direction of the basic model, setting *PKO commitment* as the dependent variable and *Coup attempt* as the explanatory variable. I lag all explanatory variables two years to control for temporal endogeneity. Since we are only interested in the countries that actually participate in peacekeeping (non-contributors cannot be penalized),

Table III. Determinants of peacekeeping participation levels, 1991–2013, fixed-effects panel regression

|                             | Dependent variable:<br><i>PKO commitment</i> |  |   |                                     |  |
|-----------------------------|--|--|---|-------------------------------------|--|
|                             | <i>TCC threshold</i><br>100 troops<br>(10)   | <i>TCC threshold</i><br>500 troops<br>(11) | <i>Only successful</i><br>coups<br>(12) | <i>Only failed</i><br>coups<br>(13) | <i>Interaction</i><br><i>w. demand</i><br>(14) |
| Coup attempt ( $t-2$ )      | -0.69*<br>(0.30)                             | -1.42**<br>(0.29)                          |   |                                     | -2.51**<br>(0.23)                              |
| Successful coup ( $t-2$ )   |  |  | -1.02†<br>(0.55)                        |                                     |  |
| Failed coup ( $t-2$ )       |  |  |   | -2.85**<br>(0.28)                   |  |
| PKO commitment ( $t-2$ )    | 0.55**<br>(0.07)                             | 0.52**<br>(0.09)                           | 0.53**<br>(0.09)                        | 0.52**<br>(0.08)                    | 0.50**<br>(0.06)                               |
| Democracy ( $t-2$ )         | -0.03<br>(0.04)                              | -0.06<br>(0.05)                            | -0.06<br>(0.05)                         | -0.05<br>(0.05)                     | -0.03<br>(0.04)                                |
| Military budget             | 15.78†<br>(8.96)                             | 27.33<br>(22.37)                           | 26.96<br>(22.18)                        | 27.23<br>(22.19)                    | 7.70<br>(5.06)                                 |
| Aggr. demand                |  |  |   |                                     | 1.24**<br>(0.37)                               |
| Coup attempt × Aggr. demand |  |  |   |                                     | 2.48**<br>(0.68)                               |
| Observations                | 865  | 495  | 495                                     | 495                                 | 865  |
| F Statistic                 | 116.05**                                     | 59.91**                                    | 58.23**                                 | 59.44**                             | 105.34**                                       |

†  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Errors clustered two-ways on countries and years. Calculations in R version 3.4.1.

I subset the data to include country-years with troop commitments above 100 troops.

Table III reports five models in which I estimate the change in *PKO commitment* following a coup event. The coefficient for *Coup attempt* in Model 7 is negative and significant, suggesting that coups are followed by troop reductions, even when holding previous troop levels constant. In substantive terms, the model predicts that countries where militaries attempt coups experience an average participation reduction of nearly 700 soldiers. Setting the participation threshold higher, at 500 troops, results in an even stronger relationship (Model 8). Models 9 and 10 show that the relationship remains robust if the DV is restricted to only successful coups or failed coups.

The theory suggests that the constraining effect should correlate with the UN's selection leverage: in periods with unmet troop demand, the UN simply cannot afford to penalize violators. To investigate this implication, I include an interaction with *Aggregate demand* in Model 11. Congruent with expectations, the positive coefficient for the interaction term indicates that association between participation and coup attempts is diminished in periods of high UN demand. Indeed, in periods when aggregate demand is at its maximum value of 1,

coups have no substantive impact on a country's future participation in UN peacekeeping.

It cannot be excluded that post-coup troop reductions are explained by alternative mechanisms. For example, it is imaginable that the observed effect is not so much a result of involuntary reduction in contributions as an effect of inability to contribute. Countries that experience coup attempts may suffer temporary incapacitation that reduces their ability to play a role in international field missions. This is a likely explanation for some cases, but given that very poor and in many ways dysfunctional states manage to contribute to UN peacekeeping at other times, it does not provide a fully convincing general account. Furthermore, such a capacity mechanism would not fit well with the observation that troop reductions are lower in periods when the UN needs more troops.

#### *Longitudinal analysis on matched country pairs: Implications for democratization*

If participation in UN peacekeeping reduces the probability of military coups at home, does it also make TCCs more democratic? Since coups are destabilizing events that slow down, or even retard, democratic




Figure 6. First panel: Governance trajectories for matched TCCs and non-TCCs, before and after TCC status is attained ('treatment') for the first group. Second panel: Democratic difference between TCCs and non-TCCs in the same time period

development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005), the expectation is that fewer coups would lead to an overall healthier democratization trajectory, and vice versa. On the other hand, coups may occasionally sweep aside authoritarian regimes and pave the way for more democratic forms of governance (Marinov & Goemans, 2014).

What patterns emerge in the data at hand? I combine case matching (Rubin, 2006) with differences-in-differences analysis (Angrist & Pischke, 2008) to compare the governance trajectories of two groups of comparable TCCs and non-TCCs. In the data, there are 20 countries that changed status from non-TCC to TCC, defined as having at least three consecutive years of UN troop commitments above 100 troops.<sup>13</sup> For each of the 'treatment' cases (new TCCs), I paired up a 'control' case with similar characteristics that remained non-TCC throughout. The aspiration is to simulate the conditions of a natural experiment: if, across pairs of comparable countries, one is selected into 'treatment' (TCCs) and one is not (non-TCCs) and the difference in outcomes after a certain time is measured, it is possible to identify the impact of peacekeeping participation on coup attempts and regime characteristics. This approach allows me to eliminate bias arising from selection on observables (matching) and from non-observed secular trends affecting all countries (DD).

I generated the matched dataset using a nearest neighbor matching algorithm (Ho et al., 2007), balancing on a

vector of pre-treatment characteristics including democracy, income level, ethnic fractionalization, military expenditure, conflict history, region, population and coup-proofing. Table IV in the appendix lists countries in the TCC ('treatment') and non-TCC ('control') groups. For each of these pairs, I extracted time-series data on democratic quality (Polity score), covering four years before the country became a TCC, the year it became a TCC, and four years afterwards, for a total of nine years. Each country in the 'control' group is observed over the nine years corresponding to its matched country.

Figure 6 displays the result of this longitudinal analysis with matched pairs. It is revealing in several ways. First, the similarity across the two groups in the pre-treatment stage suggests that the matching worked reasonably well: while the trends are different, the two groups have comparable democracy scores. Ex ante balance is also suggested by a statistical comparison of the two groups (Table A.III in the Online appendix). Second, the governance trajectories of the two groups appear to diverge in the first part of the treatment phase, with countries that became TCCs displaying an increase in average democratic quality, whereas those countries that did not become TCCs experience a stagnant trend. The second panel of Figure 6 shows a marked net difference in Polity scores once one group of countries starts contributing troops to the UN.

There is also a clear difference in the frequency of coup attempts. Of those countries that became TCCs, only three experienced coups in the five years following the shift in TCC status, whereas their non-TCC peers

<sup>13</sup> This subsample excludes countries that remained TCCs for the entire 1991–2013 period, including most major TCCs.

experienced a total of 14 coups (see Table IV in the appendix).

These results must be interpreted with caution. First, while the gap between the two groups expands during the treatment period, the downward turn in Polity scores observed in the control group starts one year before treatment. Second, tests of the mean difference between the two groups, while apparent in a diagram, do not reach standard levels of statistical significance. In other words, it is possible the observed differences are due to uncontrolled dissimilarities between groups or that differences in outcomes would not be observed were scholars able to extend the number of observed countries. However, at the very least, they suggest that existing claims (Levin et al., 2016) about the illiberal consequences of participation in UN peacekeeping do not generalize. The data presented here, representing a far larger evidentiary basis than the two cases examined by Levin et al. (2016), clearly do not exhibit a trend towards authoritarianism.

## Conclusion

Does participation in UN peacekeeping reduce coups at home? Cross-national evidence from the 1991–2013 period suggests that it does. Countries highly dependent on peacekeeping revenues are less likely to experience attempted military seizures of government. I argue that the logic of peacekeeping dependency constraints developed in this article provides a convincing explanation for the observed statistical pattern. The theory emphasizes the role of economic incentives, largely overlooked in previous studies of participation effects, and it captures a strategic dynamic that is missing from accounts based on socialization and other mechanisms.

The main empirical finding challenges prior claims that peacekeeping has destabilizing effects or reinforces illiberal governance (Savage & Caverley, 2014; Levin et al., 2016). Rather, the evidence suggests that participation in UN peacekeeping reduces coups, the most overt type of military interference, and that it may have positive effects for longer-term democratization.

The predicted effect of peacekeeping participation is heterogeneous and varies according to domestic and international factors. This resonates with Sotomayor's (2013) findings, but whereas Sotomayor explained divergence with reference to choices made by civilian authorities, my account highlights how divergence emerges, first, from variation in economic incentives facing troop-contributing militaries, and, second, from variation in the global supply and demand of peacekeepers.

The observed statistical patterns are consistent with several theoretic mechanisms, including socialization, resource shifts and external diversion. However, taken as a whole, the data fit better with the logic of peacekeeping dependency constraints presented here. For example, the finding that participation effects vary with military salaries would not be expected under socialization logics. Similarly, socialization or resource-based theories would be hard-pressed to explain why participation effects vary with the global supply of peacekeepers. Furthermore, the observation of a penalty effect, in which participation is reduced following coups, is not immediately congruent with alternative accounts. Overall, the evidence does not allow us to rule out any particular explanation, but it provides credible evidence that peacekeeping dependency constraints represent a plausible mechanism, especially in the subset of poorer countries with cash-strapped militaries.

Further empirical work can be done to confirm and elaborate the effect of peacekeeping dependency. For example, while the present study goes a long way to control for the country characteristics that may confound a comparative analysis, there remains a possibility that the UN 'looks down the road' to assess the risk of future coups in a given TCC, adjusting its offers of peacekeeping participation accordingly. Even if that seems unlikely, given the difficulty of predicting imminent coups (even sophisticated statistical models perform poorly) and the absence of clear candidates for predictors beyond those already controlled for, it cannot be ruled out based on the present evidence. At the same time, the confirmation of such pre-selection effects would not invalidate the logic presented here, but rather suggest that it operates with a shorter lag time.

Next, the study emphasized one particular aspect of civil–military relations: military coups. A natural extension of the present study is to theorize and examine the impact of participation on other dependent variables, such as military compliance and intramilitary friction (cf. Feaver, 1999). Here, it would be useful to develop a deeper understanding of political dynamics within TCCs relating to the distribution of peacekeeping revenues. Individual cases, such as the 2004 mutiny in Guinea-Bissau or the 2009 mutiny in Bangladesh, suggest that military factionalism and perceptions about unfairness regarding payments and 'who gets to go' on UN peacekeeping can produce instability, which, if generalized, may counteract the positive effects suggested here.

Furthermore, the study did not assess the full nature and implications of the finding that UN penalties vary

with aggregate peacekeeping demand. The logic is theoretically convincing, empirically plausible and, by taking credibility into account, a novel way of viewing external conditionalities. Further research should seek to develop systematic evidence on the usage of UN leverage (as indicated by the anecdotal evidence presented here) and how it is perceived by existing and prospective TCCs.

The policy implications that flow from the present study are clear. By strengthening the UN's selection leverage, for example by establishing stricter governance standards for contributing states, the observed disciplining effect can be further optimized. The stricter TCC vetting standards implemented by the UN in the last few years are a step in the right direction. However, as the analysis here shows, vetting can only be effective if the UN actually has a choice of alternative TCCs, which is premised on a sufficient global supply of peacekeepers. Consequently, the key policy implication of this study is that vetting will not reach its full impact until there is a high enough supply of peacekeepers to award the UN a real choice among alternative suppliers. In that light, it is unfortunate that most developed countries have downsized their participation in UN peacekeeping over the last two decades. In the absence of adequate contributions, the UN's depleted stock of peacekeepers will not only be less capable of having a direct effect on peace, but will also have a smaller indirect effect on the political stability of troop-contributing states.

### Replication data

The dataset and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article, along with the Online appendix, can be found at <http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets>. All analyses were conducted using R version 3.4.1.

### Acknowledgements

Sincere thanks to Peter de Souza for encouraging me to test this argument empirically; to Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Caverley, Jonas Tallberg, and Lisa Dellmuth for discussions and suggestions; to panel members at the International Studies Association annual meeting in New Orleans, 18–21 February 2015, for further insights; and to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

### References

Acemoglu, Daron & James A Robinson (2005) *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Angrist, Joshua D & Jörn-Steffen Pischke (2008) *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bellamy, Alex J & Paul D Williams (2013) *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cook, Steven A (2007) *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*. Baltimore, MD: JHU Press.
- Croissant, Yves & Giovanni Milla (2008) Panel data econometrics in R: The plm package. *Journal of Statistical Software* 27(2): 1–43.
- Desch, Michael C (2001) *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore, MD: JHU Press.
- Diallo, Amadou M (2016) Peacekeeping contributor profile: Senegal (<http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/10/14/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-senegal/>).
- Diamond, Alexis & Jasjeet S Sekhon (2013) Genetic matching for estimating causal effects. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 95(3): 932–945.
- Doyle, Michael W & Nicholas Sambanis (2000) International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis. *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 779–801.
- Dwyer, Maggie (2015) Peacekeeping abroad, trouble making at home: Mutinies in West Africa. *African Affairs* 114(455): 206–225.
- Fearon, James D (2003) Ethnic and cultural diversity by country. *Journal of Economic Growth* 8(2): 195–222.
- Feaver, Peter D (1998) Crisis as shirking: An agency theory explanation of the souring of American civil–military relations. *Armed Forces & Society* 24(3): 407–434.
- Feaver, Peter D (1999) Civil–military relations. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2(1): 211–241.
- Feaver, Peter D (2003) *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Findlay, Trevor (1996) *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*. Stockholm: SIPRI.
- Fortna, Virginia P (2008) *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University press.
- Gaibullov, Khusrav; Justin George, Todd Sandler & Hirofumi Shimizu (2015) Personnel contributions to UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions: A public goods approach. *Journal of Peace Research* 52(6): 727–742.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand (2002) Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615–637.
- Gouriéroux, Christian; Alberto Holly & Alain Monfort (1982) Likelihood Ratio test, Wald test, and Kuhn-Tucker test in linear models with inequality constraints on the regression parameters. *Econometrica* 50(1): 63–80.

- Gowan, Richard (2009) *The Future of Peacekeeping Operations: Fighting Political Fatigue and Overstretch*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Ho, Daniel E; Kosuke Imai, Gary King & Elizabeth A Stuart (2007) Matching as nonparametric preprocessing for reducing model dependence in parametric causal inference. *Political Analysis* 15(3): 199–236.
- Hunter, Wendy (1997) *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against soldiers*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P (1965) Political development and political decay. *World Politics* 17(3): 386–430.
- Lebovic, James H (2004) Uniting for peace? Democracies and United Nations peace operations after the Cold War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 910–936.
- Levin, Jamie; Joseph MacKay & Abouzar Nasirzadeh (2016) Selectorate theory and the democratic peacekeeping hypothesis: Evidence from Fiji and Bangladesh. *International Peacekeeping* 23(1): 107–132.
- Marinov, Nikolay & Hein Goemans (2014) Coups and democracy. *British Journal of Political Science* 44(4): 799–825.
- Marshall, Monty G & Keith Jagers (2002) Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2002 (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>).
- McMahon, R Blake & Branislav L Slantchev (2015) The guardianship dilemma: Regime security through and from the armed forces. *American Political Science Review* 109(2): 297–313.
- Moskos, Charles C (1975) UN peacekeepers, the constabulary ethic, and military professionalism. *Armed Forces & Society* 1(4): 388–401.
- Perry, Chris & Adam C Smith (2013) *Trends in Uniformed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping: A New Dataset, 1991–2012*. New York: International Peace Institute.
- Pevehouse, Jon C (2005) *Democracy From Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pilster, Ulrich & Tobias Böhmelt (2011) Coup-proofing and military effectiveness in interstate wars, 1967–99. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28(4): 331–350.
- Powell, Jonathan (2012) Determinants of the attempting and outcome of coups d'état. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(6): 1017–1040.
- Powell, Jonathan & Mwita Chacha (2016) Investing in stability: Economic interdependence, coups d'état, and the capitalist peace. *Journal of Peace Research* 53(4): 525–538.
- Powell, Jonathan M & Clayton L Thyne (2011) Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 48(2): 249–259.
- Rubin, Donald B (2006) *Matched Sampling for Causal Effects*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Savage, Jesse D & Jonathan D Caverley (2014) Does peacekeeping abroad bring conflict at home? Paper presented at Sixth Oceanic Conference on International Studies, University of Melbourne, 9–11 July.
- Sotomayor, Arturo C (2013) *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil-Military Relations and the United Nations*. Baltimore, MD: JHU Press.
- Stokke, Olav (1995) *Aid and Political Conditionality*. London: Routledge.
- Svolik, Milan W (2009) Power sharing and leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 477–494.
- United Nations (2008a) Generic guidelines for troop contributing countries (<http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/387419>).
- United Nations (2008b) United Nations peacekeeping operations: Principles and guidelines ([http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone\\_eng.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf)).
- Worboys, Katherine J (2007) The traumatic journey from dictatorship to democracy: Peacekeeping operations and civil–military relations in Argentina, 1989–1999. *Armed Forces & Society* 33(2): 149–168.
- Zaman, Rashed U & Niloy R Biswas (2014) Bangladesh's participation in UN peacekeeping missions and challenges for civil–military relations: A case for concordance theory. *International Peacekeeping* 21(3): 324–344.

MAGNUS LUNDGREN, b. 1976, PhD in Political Science (Stockholm University, 2014); Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University (2014–); previously with the United Nations; current research interests: armed conflict, conflict resolution, and international organizations; recent articles in *Review of International Organizations* and *Contemporary Security Policy*.

## Appendix

### Decision-theoretic model

To support the narrative logic, the following develops a decision-theoretic model based on rationalist premises. The model has one actor facing an optimization problem, a benefit-maximizing decisionmaker responsible for military policy in a country, including the degree of military intervention in domestic politics. The sole decision in the model is whether to attempt an illegal seizure of government, that is, a coup, or to continue status quo. In the status quo situation, the military is enjoying the benefits flowing from two sources of income: a military budget,  $u_1$ , which represents the funds allocated by the government to the military, and funds received for participating in UN peacekeeping,  $u_2$ . The total benefits of the military in the starting condition is the sum of these two flows, i.e.  $u_1 + u_2$ .

If a coup is undertaken, the military achieves a higher level of discretion over the allocation of government funds, increasing  $u_1$  by a factor  $\alpha \in [0, \infty]$  to

$u_1(1 + \alpha)$ , which is always greater than  $u_1$ . However, if the military engages in a coup, it becomes less attractive as a participant in UN peacekeeping, resulting in a reduction of peacekeeping revenues by a factor  $\beta \in [0, 1]$ , so that total revenues from the UN become  $u_2(1 - \beta)$ . This change may be thought of as the size of UN conditionalities for participation in UN peacekeeping. A high  $\beta$  translates into a more restrictive policy: militaries that attempt coups are not welcome. A small  $\beta$  reflects a more lenient policy.

The total benefits of the military in the coup condition is the sum of these two flows, i.e.  $u_1(1 + \alpha) + u_2(1 - \beta)$ .

Since the military prefers outcomes that maximize total revenues, it will instigate a coup if  $u_1 + u_2 < u_1(1 + \alpha) + u_2(1 - \beta)$ . Assuming that peacekeeping revenues, being money, can be written as a linear function of the military budget,  $u_2 = \gamma u_1$ , where  $\gamma$  represents the relative size of peacekeeping revenues to the regular military budget (for a military that is highly dependent on peacekeeping,  $\gamma$  is large, and vice versa), the condition under which a military is incentivized to engage in a coup becomes  $u_1 + \gamma u_1 < u_1(1 + \alpha) + \gamma u_1(1 - \beta)$ , which simplifies to  $\gamma < \alpha/\beta$ . That is, the military decisionmaker will favor a coup if the ratio of 'coup benefits' to 'UN penalties' exceeds the dependency on peacekeeping.

Examining comparative statics, it is easy to see that increasing  $\alpha$  facilitates satisfaction of the condition. This makes sense: greater post-coup revenue boosts should make militaries more willing to engage in coups. Increasing the UN's sensitivity to coups,  $\beta$ , decreases the right-hand ratio, making a military less willing to instigate a takeover. This seems reasonable: increasing the indirect

penalties imposed on coup makers should present a disincentive. Increasing the military's dependency on UN peacekeeping,  $\gamma$ , raises the threshold condition, making a military less willing to intervene, ceteris paribus. This reflects the fact that if a large share of a military's total revenue flows are channeled from the UN, foregoing these flows is more painful.

Table IV. Matched country pairs

| <i>TCCs ('treated')</i> | <i>Coup attempts</i> | <i>Non-TCCs ('control')</i> | <i>Coup attempts</i> |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| Guatemala               |                      | Haiti                       | (1991)               |
| Peru                    |                      | Jamaica                     |                      |
| Paraguay                |                      | Costa Rica                  |                      |
| Chile                   |                      | Mexico                      |                      |
| Gambia                  |                      | Colombia                    |                      |
| Senegal                 |                      | Venezuela                   | (1992), 2002         |
| Niger                   | 2010                 | Guyana                      |                      |
| Guinea                  |                      | Ecuador                     | 2000                 |
| Burkina Faso            |                      | Mali                        | 2012                 |
| Sierra Leone            |                      | Mauritania                  | 2003, 2005, 2008     |
| Togo                    | 2005                 | Ivory Coast                 |                      |
| Tanzania                |                      | Liberia                     |                      |
| Rwanda                  |                      | Chad                        | 1993                 |
| Mozambique              |                      | Congo                       |                      |
| Zambia                  |                      | Uganda                      |                      |
| Malawi                  |                      | Botswana                    |                      |
| Namibia                 |                      | Madagascar                  | 2009, 2010           |
| Morocco                 |                      | Algeria                     | (1992)               |
| Tunisia                 |                      | Sudan                       |                      |
| Mongolia                |                      | Afghanistan                 |                      |
| Cambodia                |                      | Papua New Guinea            | 2012                 |

Coup attempts outside of the relevant 4-year period in parenthesis.